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Normativity and Reality in Peirce’s
Thought
Serge Grigoriev
1 The purpose of the essay is to explore some points pertaining to Peirce’s conception of
reality, with a special emphasis on the themes developed in his later writings (such as
normativity, common sense, and the logic of signs). The resulting proposal advances a
preliminary reading of some key issues (arising in connection with Peirce’s discussions
of reality and truth), configured with a view to the socially sustainable, coordinated
practices  of  inquiry  that  are  intrinsically  embedded  in  the  biological  and  cultural
dynamics of  the evolving sense of  reasonableness in human practical  and cognitive
enterprises.
*
2 When philosophers talk about “reality,” it usually helps to distinguish between some
customary senses of the term, so as to avoid the unnecessary confusion. The following
two conceptions deserve a mention here on the account of their customary meanings:
reality as the totality of all that is or may be, regardless of our ability to experience it;
and  reality  as  the  sum  total  of  our  actual  and  possible  experiences  –  let’s  call  it
“phenomenal reality.” There is a third sense of reality, which is of principal concern to
us here – because it is the one most congenial to Peirce – namely, reality as the aspect
of the world represented in true beliefs which the inquiry ultimately aims at. This brief
essay will not bother much with the totality of what may be “out there,” apart from all
possible  experience,1 hence,  its  primary task consists  in  clearing up the distinction
between the  third  sense  of  reality,  which  happens  to  be  of  a  special  interest  to
pragmatists, and the phenomenal reality.
3 The  latter  may  be  conceptualized  as  a  largely  informal  and  abstract  projection,
depicting the field of conceivably possible experiences based on the sampling of actual
experiences that have been registered thus far. Phenomenal reality presents itself in
the  form  of  experiences,  and  is,  therefore,  always  at  least  partially  constituted  by
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thought. This thought, however, is usually neither deliberate nor rigorously structured:
experiences  just  strike  us  as  being  roughly  of  a  certain  kind.  Because  of  this,
phenomenal  reality  is  often  simply  thought  of  as  “external  reality”  –  that  which
impinges,  or  is  capable  of  impinging,  on  us  by  way  of  experience.  As  such,  it  is
determinable in countless ways, yet it is never fully determinate.2 Reality in the sense
pursued here, on the other hand, is something deliberately constructed in the light of
inputs from the phenomenal world, so as to produce the sense of a reasonable totality.
Accordingly,  when  one  uses  the  term  “real”  correlatively  with  this  latter  sense  of
“reality,” one does not mean something merely external or perceptible; instead, the
meaning of the word “real,” here, can be more properly assimilated to that of “true,”
with the proviso that, because our grasp of reality and truth is never complete, what is
meant thereby is something like “roughly true.”
4 Reality, then, is a rationalization of the field of experience, represented in true beliefs
which together provide the direction for reasonable thought. Reasonable thought, in
turn, is the kind of thought that represents the world as intelligible or, perhaps more
precisely,  hospitable  to  the  purposeful  existence  of  reasoning  beings.  Such  a  view,
moreover, is congruent with the positions advanced in the familiar Peircean literature.
5 Peirce  himself,  of  course,  directly  challenged  the  assumption  that  reality  must  be
understood as independent of thought (CP 5.430, 1905); in his view, we can only know
the “human aspect” of things, and that is “all the universe is for us” (Peirce 1911, 43).3
That  reality  must  be  further  understood  as  an  intended  product  of  constructive
thought is suggested, for example, by Rosenthal’s discussion of the distinction between
occurrence and fact (1994, 5-6), where facts emerge as the result of a deliberate analysis
of  occurrences.  Reality,  then,  as  Rosenthal  explains,  is  constituted  as  a  consistent
system  of  facts  (ibid.,  2-3),  i.e.,  reality  is  ultimately  existence  as  analyzed.  When
Rosenthal says that the “world is dependent upon the meaning system that grasps in a
way in which reality as independent is not” (ibid., 7) and is, ultimately, the “ideal of a
complete synthesis of possible experience” (ibid., 8), she means by “world” what is here
meant by “reality;” and by “reality,” what is here meant by “phenomenal reality.”
6 Peirce’s view of fact as something abstracted from experience (CP 6.67, 1898) is also
emphasized by Hookway, who underscores the important and indissoluble connection
between the constitution of facts and the accepted practices of inquiry in relation to
which  alone  facts  can  acquire  their  proper  meaning  (Hookway  2000,  90-1).4 And  a
somewhat  related  point  can  be  made  in  connection  with  Misak’s  view  that  “it  is
misleading to talk of the truth as being the complete description of the world” (1991,
149).  Moreover,  according  to  Misak,  a  description  merely  aspiring  to  completeness
would  not  do  at  all,  for  not  only  should  the  eventually  attained  belief  “fit
harmoniously” with the other parts  of  our knowledge (2010,  87),  such beliefs  must
additionally  possess  epistemic  virtues  such  as  “fecundity,  simplicity,  and  the  like”
(1991, 82).
7 Hence, the ultimate description of reality is less about comprehension understood in
terms  of  coverage,  and  more  about  generating  a  particular  style  of  thought,
distinguished by a number of intellectual virtues. As Peirce puts it: “thought is of the
nature of a sign. In that case, then, if we can find out the right method of thinking and
can follow it out – the right method of transforming signs – then truth can be nothing
more nor less than the last result to which the following out of this method would
ultimately carry us.” (CP 5.553, 1906.)5 Reality, then, may be usefully thought of as the
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object  of  knowledge,  with  knowledge  understood  as  properly  functioning  thought,
while the nature of what that means, or what it means to be that, is being worked out
continuously in truth-conducive inquiries.
8 At  the  same  time,  one  must  not  be  tempted  to  expect  the  eventual  absorption  of
phenomenal  reality  into  thought.  The  view  defended  here  is  realistic  in  the  sense
indicated by Hausman when he insists that what is real must be “to some extent or in
some way  independent  of  mental  construction”  (1993,  144).  The  experience  always
contains “the residue of what is never exhausted by interpretation in any finite time”
(ibid., 156). In other words, it always contains the real possibilities of the development
of our present experience in ways that we do not presently anticipate.
*
9 Two further ideas need to be introduced at this point. The first is concerned with the
normative themes of Peirce’s later work. Some scholars find his reflections on the topic
too vague to be of any real use, yet Peirce himself considered them to be incredibly
important, and his system without them – radically incomplete (Maddalena 2010, 262).
His position is understandable for, without these considerations, it is not clear what the
purpose  of  inquiry  should  be,  nor  what  form  its  final  fruits  should  take.  Logical
consistency  or  rapport  with  experience  may  seem  like  self-evident  desiderata;
however,  on the one hand,  they are insufficient  to  delimit  the ultimately desirable
perspective, and on the other, they are (in turn) also vague – how much consistency
and at what price? What sort of rapport? It  seems that such questions can only be
answered or even posed legitimately only in conjunction with some conception of an
ideal  form  of  life,  based  on  and  conducive  to  a  certain  right manner  of  thought.
According  to  Peirce,  the  purpose  of  inquiry  is  to  develop  “degrees  of  self-control
unknown to primitive man” (CP 5.511, 1905-8), enabling us to develop appropriate rules
of conduct, and to improve these rules through subsequent criticism (CP 5.533, 1905-8).
The end of inquiry, then, must consist in establishing a certain form of life, a way of
thinking and existing in the world in accordance with the best that we know. But what
is  best?  Self-mastery according to  Peirce  should be  exercised to  render  human life
“beautiful, admirable” (Peirce 1909, 36). The ground of preference, then, is ultimately
esthetic (ibid.).
10 Peirce’s definition of esthetic ideal as that which is admirable in itself (CP 1.612, 1903;
CP  2.199,  1902)  is  not  immensely  helpful;  however,  he  provides  us  with  a  more
substantial  clue  when  he  describes  the  sense  of  esthetic  fulfillment  in  terms  of
“intellectual  sympathy,  a  sense  that  here  is  a  Feeling  that  one  can comprehend,  a
reasonable  feeling”  (CP  5.113,  1903).  In  fact,  along  with  logic  and  ethics,  esthetic
sensibility bears witness to the intrinsic reasonableness of the world, confirming, in the
sensuous  modality,  our  intellectual  intuition  that  “general  principles  are  really
operative in nature” (CP 5.101, 1903).6 Provided this much, it seems possible to credit
Peirce with something like a Kantian view of esthetic ideal.
11 According to Kant, the esthetic experience of beauty attests to the harmony between
mind  and  nature  (CJ  §42,  5:300),7 comprehended  in  explicitly  moral  terms.  Human
beings want to see some evidence that the universe is responsive to their cognitive and
moral needs (CJ, Introduction, 5, 184), and these needs, in turn, are understood by Kant
primarily  in  terms of  a  consistent  exercise  of  moral  autonomy.  To lead a  dignified
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existence, we need to act according to a set of rules, which would enable us, without
sacrificing  consistency  and  integrity,  to  maximize  the  opportunities  for  acting  in
accordance with our best judgment, instead of merely yielding to the brute force of
contingent  circumstances.  To  the  degree  that  we  succeed  in  actively  leading  a  life
instead of being pushed around by it, we can be said to be free. Accordingly, aesthetic
experience suggests to Kant that the lawfulness of  nature may harmonize with our
pursuit of freedom or moral autonomy in accordance with the dictates of our reason
(CJ, Introduction, 5, 176). It is in this sense that nature, through esthetic contemplation,
shows itself to be reasonable. Is it too much of a stretch to think of Peirce’s esthetic
ideal of concrete reasonableness in terms of preconditions for the meaningful exercise
of rational autonomy? If not, then, we must reckon with the esthetic constraint thus
understood in thinking about the shape that our inquiries must take.
12 And this leads, rather naturally, to the second consideration. Peirce asks: “But what is
esthetically  good?  Perhaps  we  may  say  the  full  expression  of  an  idea?  Thought,
however, is in itself essentially of the nature of a sign. But a sign is not a sign unless it
translates itself into another sign in which it is more fully developed. Thought requires
achievement  for  its  own development,  and without  this  development  it  is  nothing.
Thought must live and grow in incessant new and higher translations, or it proves itself
not to be genuine thought.” (CP 5.594, 1903.) The purpose of rational existence, then,
must  be,  in  part,  to  create  the  conditions  most  favorable  to  the  perpetuation  and
development of thought.
13 Unlike a material object, consciousness per se has no staying power; it cannot abide.
Thought  is  the  primary  mode  of  the  endurance  of  consciousness,  and,  through its
endurance,  thought  acquires  reality:  it  begins  to  matter,  begins  to  generate
consequences. The mode of endurance appropriate to a substance – namely, identity –
in the case of thought is replaced by the mode of endurance appropriate to an event –
namely, continuity (and a generative, dynamic continuity, at that). The mode of the
endurance of thought, and the constitutive condition of its reality, is the mechanism of
representation,  which,  if  understood properly,  includes  interpretation as  one of  its
constitutive  moments.  To continue to  exist,  in  other  words,  a  thought  needs  to  be
carried on, it  needs to be put forth, and picked up, and bounced back: the thought
remains real only so long as the thought, or one of its derivations, is in play. This is, in
fact,  what  Gallie  once  called  Peirce’s  “most  characteristic  and  fundamental
philosophical insight:” that thought and the sign that expresses it, be it a formula or a
sentence, “is essentially something to be developed, something that requires or calls
for development” (Gallie 1966, 46). To stay alive, a thought needs to be repeated, and, to
be repeated effectively, it needs to be challenged, corrected, amplified, retold… “There
is  no  exception,”  says  Peirce,  “to  the  law  that  every  thought-sign  is  translated  or
interpreted in a subsequent one, unless it be that all thought comes to an abrupt and
final end in death.” (W 2,224, 1868.)
14 The proper business of philosophy, then, is logic broadly construed – that is, the study
of  the  methods  for  properly  developing  the  pertinent  consequences  of  signs  or
thoughts. Thoughts, in the non-psychological sense of the word, exist in the form of
signs, and a sign, according to Peirce, is “an object which is in relation to its object on
the  one  hand  and  to  an  interpretant  on  the  other  in  such  a  way  as  to  bring  the
interpretant  into  a  relation to  the object,  corresponding to  its  own relation to  the
object.” (Peirce 1904, 11.) In other words, the logic of representation that governs the
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genesis and circulation of signs incorporates essentially two distinctive yet intertwined
functions: a referential function, insofar as a sign always points to its subject matter,8
and a communicative function, insofar as a sign is always addressed to someone, calling
for a response. Hookway expresses a similar point when he says that there are two
questions  with  which  semiotic  concerns  itself:  how  can  thoughts  and  sentences
represent reality, and how can inquirers collaborate within a community (1992, 119)?
*
15 The communicative aspect of the problem must be dealt with in the context of what
Peirce calls his “social theory of reality” (CP 6.610, 1893). It is in being corrected by
others that we first encounter the notion that reality is independent of one’s private
opinion, learning, consequently, to associate the idea of truth with that which “would
stand in  the long run” in  the course  of  critical  public  deliberation (W 2,239,  1868).
Participation in rational discourse, i.e., in the only form of life that assures to thought a
stable  prospect  of  orderly  development,  requires  an  assumption  that  one  may  be
willingly  compelled  to  come  to  an  agreement  when  presented  with  sufficient
argumentation. Acceptable forms of argumentation, of course, are governed by public
norms; but so are the acceptable forms of evidence. Discourse, as Misak rightly claims,
can  only  remain  rational  so  long  as  it  remains  evidence-sensitive  (1991,  60);  and
evidence is always evidence not only of something but also for someone prepared to
recognize it as such.
16 The notion of agreement attained in the process of rational inquiry, in turn, is related
to the distinctly problematic notion of convergence. Thus, Peirce declares: “Different
minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the process of investigation
carries  them  by  a  force  outside  themselves  to  one  and  the  same  conclusion…  No
modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural
bent of mind even, can enable man to escape the predestinate opinion.” (W 3,273, 1878.)
Such language is liable to give rise to an idea of an invisible universal guiding order,
which may be interpreted, for example, in terms of a “teleological tendency” towards
“lawfulness and consistency” and “away from fragmentation” (Hausman 1993, 33) – or,
say, in terms of “increasingly unified information” (DeMarco 1971, 26) collected by the
inherent  movement  of  evolutionary  process  (Mahowald  1973,  180). It  is  clear  that
Peirce was continuously drawn to something of this sort, even though it may appear as
a  piece  of  indefensible  cosmological  speculation.  Some scholars  are  more  sanguine
about accepting Peirce’s view for what it is. My own view is closer to that of Hookway,
who points out that, since Peirce’s “treatments of the topic generally have a throwaway
character”  (2000,  4),  presented in  a  grand fashion as  the predetermined destiny of
thought, convergence remains “simply a metaphysical mystery” (ibid., 50-1).
17 Fortunately, Peirce occasionally approaches the issue in a more cautious spirit. Thus, as
some scholars have convincingly argued (Misak 1991, 149; Sokolowski 1997, 82-3), it is
ill-advised to confuse the contention that we should hope to find an answer to any well-
formed  question  with  the  notion  that  we  may  ultimately  arrive  at  some  all-
encompassing final vision of the universe. Peirce himself makes a similar point: “We
must  look  forward  to  the  explanation,  not  of  all  things,  but  of  any  given  thing
whatever.” (W 6,206, 1890.) Later he qualifies this with a cautionary warning that we
should not even expect an answer to every specific question, because there are “real
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vagues,  and especially real possibilities” (CP 5.453, 1905).  Construed in terms of the
success of concrete inquiries, the notion of convergence begins to sound much more
promising. It becomes even more so, when we take into account the fact that Peirce
frequently  refers  to  the  prospect  of  convergence  even  with  respect  to  particular
inquiries as merely a “hope” (W 3, 273, 1878, CP 6.610, 1893, CP 8.113, 1900), which
prompts us to press on with our research. Hence, one may be warranted, after all, in
provisionally setting the prospects of grand convergence aside, focusing instead on an
analysis of particular episodes of convergence.
18 Thus, when two travelers set out for the same destination, assuming that it is a real
destination and not a fruit of their fantasy, their search should terminate in a meeting,
and the place of this meeting can be said to be preordained in virtue of their intentions.
This  terminus  ad  quem is  that  which  corresponds  to  the  declared  purpose  of  their
journey, in the same way that the correct answer corresponds to a well-put question –
i.e., by constituting a response that conclusively fulfills the aspiration declared at the
outset. This meeting, of course, need not necessarily take place: the travelers may fail
to  reach  their  destination  for  various  reasons.  Yet,  even  if  they  meet,  the  fact  of
meeting by itself does not signify that the right destination has been reached. Mere
agreement does not constitute the rightness of the answer; instead, the right answer
serves  as  the  basis  of  warranted  agreement.  Chance  meetings  abound,  and  so  do
gratuitous alliances of opinion.
19 Part of the reason to insist that the place of our meeting is determined beforehand by
the nature of our search is to secure the sense that there is a place we ought to meet, so
as  to  come together  independently  to  an agreement  of  a  very  special  sort  –  i.e.,  a
rational agreement. One reason we may cherish the hope that this type of agreement is
possible  is  that  it  testifies  to  the  ability  of  our  thought  to  pick  out  what  is
independently intended by the thoughts of another; in other words, it shows that we
can truly share thoughts – which is a tad bit more than warmly holding hands. Would
one be right to conclude, then, that rational thought aims at fulfilling the imperative of
the  social  impulse?  No,  if  by  this  is  meant  an  increase  in  the  sense  of  unity  and
belonging owing to the eliding of all disagreements and tensions. If rational thought is
to  serve  the  interests  of  sociality,  its  functioning  must  be  understood  in  terms  of
transforming the kind of community that we strive for. It cannot be a community of
universal  assent,  for  in  such  a  community,  thought  would  cease.  It  cannot  be  a
community preoccupied merely with the accumulation of certified results, because in
accepting the same formula, people do not need to share the same thought; in fact, to
accept and use a formula, one need not have any pertinent thoughts at all. Instead, it
should be a community that pursues the development of reliable methods of inquiry
and inference, promulgates the standards and strategies of effective argumentation,
cultivates the skill of selecting and finding relevant evidence, and continues to improve
its standards of what counts as a responsible and meaningful response to whatever
conditions our shared experience. A community of this sort would progressively secure
for its members the possibility of seeing what another person means, thereby securing
the possibility of rational agreement or disagreement. Formation of such a community
is, of course, in the interest of thought, because it assures the best chances of thought’s
continuous perpetuation and fruitful development.
20 What of convergence, then? As a hope or a regulative ideal (Hausman 1993, 134),  it
appears to mark the conditions under which the intentionality of thought can have
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public standing – meaning that others9 can grasp the content of one’s thoughts, what
one’s thoughts are about, as opposed to, say, one’s psychological states, or the words
running through one’s  head.  The  idea  of  convergence,  in  other  words,  secures  the
conceptual  possibility of  several  thoughts sharing the same subject  matter,  even in
cases where this subject matter is not present but merely anticipated or suggested in
actual experience. Furthermore, in guiding our inquiries,  the putative (or idealized)
projected  convergence  supplies  the  conceptual  possibility  of  a  sense  of  failure  or
success  with respect  to what we ought to  think,  allowing us to distinguish,  at  least
provisionally, between better and worse modes of reasoning and research practices,
laying thereby the potential  foundations for a transition to a more rational type of
community.
21 The notion of eventual convergence accomplished through the sheer accumulation of
experience, as nature nudges us along, may seem attractive in theory, but in theory
alone. To manage things is not to understand them; and, of its own accord, experience
merely reminds us  what we must  cope with,  not  what we must  learn from it.  Yet,
thinking of convergence in purely transcendental terms is also hardly satisfactory. We
can attempt to think of it, then, as a theoretical projection based on the experience of
what, for lack of a better term, may be called the experience of apparent convergence:
i.e., a perfectly routine experience of two or more investigators arriving at the same
result,  with  this  result  withstanding further  examination by  other  investigators,  at
least for the time being. Thus, when we agree that it is raining outside, anyone who
cares  to  check is  bound to  concur  with our  view.  We could  turn out  to  be  wrong:
provisional convergence is merely apparent, and as such, it is more of a convergence-
effect. Its genuineness is intrinsically defeasible. Yet, it is quite enough to give one a
concrete sense of what a genuine convergence would be like – to hope that it may, in
fact, be attainable through pursuing the inquiries that scholars are engaged in, and to
foster  a  preference  for  research  strategies  that  tend  to  consistently  produce  such
episodes of apparent convergence. We need no more, provided that we are prepared to
admit that our trust, here as elsewhere, may well be misplaced.
*
22 Returning to  the topic  of  the relationship between representation and reality,  it  is
possible to broach the issue by considering Peirce’s distinction between immediate and
dynamical objects. The dynamical object corresponds roughly to the subject matter of
thought; the immediate object is the way in which the subject matter is represented in
the sign or thought. A dark cloud on the horizon is the immediate object of my thought,
but the dynamical object, or the subject matter, of my thought is not a dark cloud but
whatever presently appears to me as a dark cloud; should it turn out to be a swarm of
locusts, the immediate object of my thought would change, but the dynamical object, or
subject matter, will remain the same – for, all along, my eyes and thoughts were fixed
on the swarm, which in my thoughts got provisionally assimilated to the image of a
cloud. The dynamical object is that to which our thought is directed; yet it is always
directed under some more or less specific  guise,  under a concept,  a  designation,  in
short, a sign. Our interpretation is always directed at the dynamical object (the subject
matter), but it always attaches to an immediate object (a provisional identification).10
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23 Provisional identification, to invoke Donnellan’s distinction, to some degree performs
primarily a referential rather than an attributive function. My mention of a dark cloud,
despite being descriptively mistaken in the end, still  pegs the subject matter under
consideration,  since  it  succeeds  in  directing  your  gaze  towards  the  phenomenon
intended. The immediate object is a “hint” or mark by which the dynamical object is
indicated (Peirce 1908, 31), while the dynamical object itself cannot be predicatively
specified,  and  can  only  be  grasped  by  the  interpreter  with  the  help  of  “collateral
experience” (CP 8.3 14,  1909).  The reason for this  is  that the dynamical  object (the
subject matter of our inquiry) is the object “regardless of any aspect of it, the object in
such relations as unlimited and final study would show it to be” (CP 8.183, undated),
while  predication is  necessarily  restricted to  some specifiable  aspect  of  the  subject
matter under consideration. That is precisely the sense in which the dynamical object
(or subject matter) “is exactly that about which more can be learned” (Short 2007, 199);
it  is  never exhausted by our present understanding of  it.  Provisional  identification,
from this perspective,  merely  aids  us  in  designating or  hypostasizing the  object  of
inquiry (Cf. ibid., 268).
24 On the other hand, it is necessary to note a contrary point: namely, that the function of
the provisional identification is never merely referential, for it is also, in an important
sense, attributive. Thus, while a provisional identification may fail to rightly specify the
appropriate attributes of the dynamical object, it nonetheless directs our inquiry along
a certain path, which may be more or less promising. The immediate object may be just
a handle by which we attempt to pick up the object, but the object itself is, in the end,
just so many handles by which we may try to pick it up. As Hausman points out, one
cannot  think  of  the  goal  of  our  inquiries  as  an  “extra-conceptual  condition  of
interpretation” or a thing-in-itself  (1993, 27).  It  can only be thought insofar as it  is
already related to thought – through a provisional identification that both points to the
object  and  suggests  a  direction  in  which  further  determinations  may  be  gainfully
sought.
25 Is  there  a  point  at  which  the  interpretive  process  can  be  said  to  have  reached its
terminus?  If  we  started  out  by  observing  a  fast-moving  dot  and,  having  tracked it
consistently, identified it as a car, we may be entitled to reject all further skepticism as
contrived. External reality has forced its verdict on our senses: the car has proved itself
to  be  a  car.  This  sounds  convincing,  but  such predominance  of  brute  externality
unfortunately underplays the role of thought in constituting its subject matter: the car
would reveal itself to be a car no matter what one previously thought about it. Suppose,
instead, that from the rapidly advancing cloud of dust emerged a slow-moving turtle.
We must accept the turtle for what it is – it crawls right past our feet; but would we not
be  plagued  by  a  suspicion  that  the  subject  matter  (the  dynamical  object)  of  our
attention has changed, that we were really tracking something else? It  seems quite
plausible that, on such an occasion, we would be asking ourselves what it was, in fact,
that  we  have  been tracking,  instead  of  blissfully  accepting  the  turtle  as  the  whole
answer.
26 Thoughts  are  occasioned  by  something  external,  yet  the  identity  of  an  external
condition  is  predicated  on  our  ability  to  intelligibly  reconstitute  the  continuity
between the provisional identifications of  what it was that our thoughts have been
about.  A  radical  discontinuity  in  one’s  provisional  conceptualizations  of  dynamical
object  tends  to  undermine  one’s  faith  in  the  continuity  of  reference.  The  external
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counts as the real only with the proviso that there is some hope of such (conceptual)
continuity  being  restored  –  for  example,  through  an  attribution  of  an  intelligible
perceptual error. A radical and unexplainable discontinuity in perception suggests a
breakdown of  the  ordinary  apparatus  of  reference.  If  my cat  turns  into  a  palpable
elephant upon eating some cereal, the sorry state of my mental faculties is really the
only elephant in the room.
27 This brings up an important point: external is only real (potentially) insofar as we are
entertaining some hope of successfully (and, better yet, reliably) directing our own and
(better yet) one another’s thought towards it. External reality, then, is not something
that merely forces itself upon us, but whatever forces itself upon us in ways that are, at
least in principle, amenable to reason. In this sense, the true mark of the real is not,
contrary  to  the  ordinary  view,  that  we  are  ineluctably  responsive  to  it  (we  are
responsive  to  delirium  and  madness),  but  that  it  is  responsive  to  our  attempts  at
reasoning about it. The sociable nature of intelligible thought works, here, as a check
against  the  brute  force  of  individual  experience.  External  reality,  in  short,  is  that
element of the external that tends to respond to our purposeful mental efforts – by
either  reinforcing  or  frustrating  them  in  roughly  intelligible  ways.  It  is  not  the
universe, but merely the element of reasonableness within it.
28 Concern  with  the  enduring  continuity  of  reference  sheds  light  on  yet  another
interesting subject:  the function of vagueness in reality-oriented discourse.  A vague
sign,  unlike  a  general  sign,  does  not  by  itself  specify  the  criteria  of  its  correct
application; it intrinsically calls for further conceptual elaboration (CP 5.447, 1905). As
such, it merely waves in the direction of its intended object without providing us with a
secure grasp on it.  Yet, Peirce insists that vagueness is not a defect in thinking (CP
4.344, 1905), and “is no more to be done away with in the world of logic than friction in
mechanics”  (CP  5.512,  1905).  Part  of  the  point  is  pragmatic:  “perfect  accuracy  of
thought is unattainable,” and overstrained efforts at rigor and clarity routinely result
in  greater  confusion  (Peirce  1903,  4).  But  more  importantly,  vagueness  has  a
distinctively  positive  function  in  the  conceptual  economy  of  research.  By  being
intrinsically  indeterminate,  a  vague  designation  invites  contextually  sensitive  co-
determination,  wherein we exercise  our  judgment  in  light  of  realistically  obtaining
pragmatic considerations (Hookway 2000, 58-9). Since such specific determinations are
never fully binding and, at least in principle,  infinitely revisable, the evolution of a
vague term may continue indefinitely, with each new permutation seen as an extension
of its originally intended meaning, intrinsically related to and at least partially implied
in the things that have been already said about it. Development of meaning over time,
as Putnam observes, is capable of reflecting not merely a change in the use of words,
but changes in interpreting our ways of life (1995, 302).
29 The significance of this point emerges when one compares the development potential
of a vague versus a general term. A general term is surely capable of evolving as we
gain a progressively better understanding of its area of proper application. The key
distinguishing feature of  a  vague term in this  regard is  merely the fact  that it  can
simultaneously  support  a  number of  incompatible  developments  or  determinations.
This is why most logicians find vague terms to be particularly troublesome. One must,
then, think of some positive function that can be served by courting such conceptual
confusion. It does not seem implausible to claim that such a function may be related to
the  sheer  versatility  permitted  by  allowing  the  proliferation  and  coexistence  of
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partially  incommensurable  interpretations.  Such  versatility,  of  course,  introduces
considerable slack into the system, inevitably loosening the sense of what counts as an
appropriate interpretation of the same subject matter. The sacrifice of clarity results
somewhat paradoxically in the increased stability of discourse: we are permitted ample
resources for continuously improvising connections that establish a sense of intelligible
continuity between the new determinations forced upon us by the new experience and
changing practice and earlier provisional determinations through which the subject
matter of our discourse has been fixed thus far. Vagueness, in other words, permits one
to retain a sense of the continuity of reference through a series of radical conceptual
innovations. This point is ostensibly related to the point made by Rosenthal when she
says that common sense provides “the vague criterion of the shared meaningfulness
and  sense  of  workability  of  incommensurable  scientific  theories”  (1994,  16).  The
essential  vagueness  of  common-sense  concepts  is  their  most  remarkable  logical
characteristic; yet, within the framework of Peirce’s common-sensism, such concepts
provide an indispensable foundation for inquiry.
30 Philosophers have long tended to think of externality in terms of correspondence, and
present observations may shed some light on how the meaning of this term can be most
gainfully construed.11 External reality to which we are answerable cannot be seen as
thought-independent.  In  fact,  its  distinguishing  mark  qua  intelligible  externality
consists  in  its  responsiveness  to  reasoning  and  reason-guided  action.  It  need  not
pander to our preconceptions, yet, even in frustrating them, it needs to leave some
traces from which the intelligibility of our error may be, in principle, restored. What
matters then is not so much the clarity of vision, but a sense of continued interaction
and contact – a retention of the sense of a long-inhabited conceptualized space that
supports a particular field of practice by supplying its subject matter, which, however
vaguely and changeably specified,  in virtue of this very vagueness and imprecision,
never leaves us for long with the feeling that it has completely eluded our grasp or
receded beyond it. Through all the permutations of “matter,” despite false starts and
enduring aberrations, physics never entirely loses touch with it subject matter – the
material world – at the crudest level of understanding.
31 Relating the idea of  externality  to  the inventive maintenance of  a  field  of  practice
grounded in the common subject matter belonging to the realm of shared experience
(possible or actual) provides one with a number of advantages that the classical view of
correspondence  sorely  lacks.  Most  importantly  it  allows  one  to  avoid the  idea  of
correspondence  or  confrontation  without  interpretation,  wherein  the  lucky
propositions home in on some mysteriously pre-conceptual data to claim a destined
match.  Instead,  one  can  simply  talk  of  sentences  (say,  of  atomic  theory)  rightly
interpreted  in  accordance  with  a  set  of  established  discursive  practices  (of,  say,
physics), suitably announced in conjunction with certain experiences (say, instrument
recordings),  elicited through some coordinated procedures belonging to the field of
practice, and interpreted in accordance with the standard reporting protocols of this
practice. The sense of correspondence here is an artifact of successfully coordinated
practices, which mediate a sense of effortless continuity within the specified theory-
experience complex. One could, then, hazard a guess that metaphysical intuitions about
correspondence are merely an extrapolation of the concrete instances of correspondence
effects, which tie together and result from the successfully coordinated practices of the
sort we have described. Effects of convergence, then, can be further explicated in terms of
correspondence thus understood:  two practices converge whenever they succeed in
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systematically  eliciting  some  results  or  predictions  recognized  as  equivalent  in
accordance with the standard interpretive procedures of both practices.
32 The  approach  outlined  here,  with  respect  to  both  of  these  key  notions,  can  be
underscored  nicely  by  Skagestad’s  suggestion  that  truth  or  reality  is  “beyond  any
actual experience; still it can be given a meaning by extrapolation from the experience
of  that  finite  process  by  which  scientists  have  so  far  reached  agreements,  and  of
experimental procedures involved in that process.” (1981, 83.) Hence, it stands opposed
to the transcendental approaches, such as Apel’s, whereby one thinks of truth as the
“idealization”  worked  out  from  the  viewpoint  of  an  “an  indefinite  and  unlimited
community of researchers” (2004, 45-6). The danger of the latter type of approach, in
my  opinion,  is  that  we  may  find  ourselves  engaged  in  the  pointless  project  of
determining “what the relationship between truth and inquiry would be if inquiry were
something it is not” (Misak 1991, 154).
*
33 While the considerations discussed thus far suggest some pointers with respect to the
likely conditions of rational inquiry, they are somewhat too general to provide a sense
of the governing dynamics of inquiry in the long run. To attempt a little clarity on this
front, one may want to look at the conditions of inquiry that are, in a qualified sense,
extra-logical. Specifically, one may want to think about the role of the common sense,
as  the  ground  for  the  routine  confidence  that  we  do  have  a  basic  grip  on  our
experience,  as  well  as  the  conception  of  the  aesthetic  impulse,  which  urges  the
inquirers to seek the types of explanation possessing certain architectonically desirable
traits.
34 There is something distinctive about the role that our common-sense beliefs perform in
providing  us  with  a  feeling  of  groundedness  in  the  shared  world.  Yet,  ordinarily
understood, our common-sense beliefs are too varied and too disorderly to provide any
definitive clue as to why that actually is the case. One may want to look instead for
some deeper shared common-sense structures and, unless one does so, it may not be
easy to make sense of Peirce’s contention that there may be a “fixed list” of common-
sense beliefs “the same for all men” (CP 5.509, 1905). If, however, one were to agree to
make an assumption that our ordinary common-sense beliefs could be seen as modified
and particularized expressions of an underlying set of some (nearly) universally shared
beliefs, then what Peirce had in mind becomes readily apparent. Those common-sense
beliefs would, indeed, “vary a little and but a little under varying circumstances and in
distant ages” (CP 5.444, 1905).
35 One can further note that, according to Peirce, common-sense depends on “the total
everyday  experience  of  many  generations  of  multitudinous  populations”  (CP  5.522,
1905). Hence, common sense can change and grow: it does not simply arise at one point
as a new characteristic feature of our biological endowment. However, it changes but
little,  suggesting either a biological mode of transmission or the presence of a very
strong empirical constraint on the prospects of the viability of alternative theoretical
conjectures  that  can  be  plausibly  made  at  this  level  of  cognitive  operation.  The
difference at stake is one between a genetic and a cultural mode of transmission: in
either case, however, universally shared common sense must be seen as a product of an
externally constrained convergent development.
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36 Apel  believes  that  common sense  in  Peirce  is  intended to  replace  Kant’s  apriorism
(2004,  40),  without  speculating  about  the  exact  genesis  of  common-sense  beliefs.
Hookway, meanwhile,  is  inclined to trace them to some innate conceptions such as
space, time, and force, accounted for, in turn, by the work of natural selection (2000,
167).  This  approach may appear to be promising,  in part  because Peirce’s  one-time
friend,  evolutionary philosopher  Chauncey Wright,  had articulated precisely  such a
view – known in the pertinent literature as “functional apriori” – wherein the primary
categories of thought emerge as the product of the action of natural selection upon
subsequent generations of human beings aiming to fruitfully cope with experienced
environment. Peirce himself mentions that we have “from birth some notions, however
crude and concrete, of force, matter, space, and time,” as well as “some notion of what
sort of objects their fellow-beings are, and of how they will act on given occasions.” (W
4.450, 1883.) Misak further cites some textual evidence suggesting that we could rightly
describe  both  abductive  reasoning  (1991,  98)  and  the  “generalized  ideal  of  good
reasoning” or “instinctive logic” (ibid., 91) as products of evolutionary adaptation.
37 The evolutionary conjecture is further confirmed by Peirce’s view that as we depart
ever  further  from  natural  conditions  that  influenced  the  growth  of  the  mind,  the
guiding force of natural suggestion progressively wanes (W 8,100, 1891). As we abandon
conditions resembling the “primitive mode of life,” our vague common-sense beliefs
cease to be indubitable (CP 5.445, 1905) and, one would imagine, become increasingly
unreliable. This is, of course, one of the reasons why common-sensism always has to be
critical, taking its cue from common sense, but scrutinizing it rigorously and setting
conventional beliefs entirely aside when necessary (Hookway 2000, 179). Furthermore,
generally,  one  can  expect  the  helpful  direction  from  common-sense  beliefs  to  be
limited almost entirely to the sphere of practical adaptation (Short 2007, 344), where
selective pressure can exercise its influence.
38 The picture, however, is somewhat more complicated for, even as he acknowledges the
diminished  usefulness  of  “natural  light”  as  we  “advance  further  and  further  into
science,”  Peirce  maintains,  nonetheless,  that  its  glimmer,  however  faint,  remains
indispensable in recommending to us hypotheses that “make upon us the impression of
simplicity” since “the existence of a natural instinct for truth is, after all, the sheet-
anchor of science” (CP 7.220, 1901). Perhaps one should say “nothing new:” in fact, we
have  “a  natural  bent  in  accordance  with  nature’s,”  because  our  interactions  with
nature over generations, have so to speak, bent us that way (CP 6.477, 1908, and CP
1.121, 1896). One could even explain how an instinctive mode of thinking, developed
under the conditions of practical struggles for survival, could be of help in the most
exquisite theoretical reaches of science.
39 Think of a painter, for example, whose eye is trained by looking at the polymorphous
abundance of natural forms. Now set before her eyes an abstract composition. It is not
of nature; it is contrived. And yet, the painter may judge it as being natural, as having
life, or as being strained and lifeless. What “naturalness” designates here is a sense of a
prevailing mood, which sets the proportions of various defining relationships, in such a
way as to endow the manifold with a definitive type of complex unity, so as to make it
feel  “right,” “simple,” or plausible.  Failure to capture a sense of natural  qualitative
order,  then,  would  be  experienced  as  a  disturbance  of  sensibility,  as  somehow
awkward, difficult, or poorly digestible. Construed thus, the intuition that gives us a
sense of what theory is more worth pursuing would have to be understood in negative
Normativity and Reality in Peirce’s Thought
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VI-1 | 2014
12
terms,  producing  a  vague sense  of  awkwardness  and disturbance  whenever  we are
presented  with  something  that  violates  the  natural  composition  to  which  we  have
become unconsciously inured.
40 While all this may indeed be so, it is also clear that, for Peirce, the truth-instinct also
has  a  positive,  actively  guiding,  enticing,  or  beckoning  role.  It  is the  element  of
reasonableness  in  the universe  “to  which we can train  our  own reason” (CP 5.160,
1903),  and  the  active  voice  here  seems  to  indicate  that  this  element  is  positively
perceived and sought, rather than being gradually forced upon us through instinctive
avoidance  of  physical  or  intellectual  distress.  There  are  at  least  two  sound
considerations for why a demand for such an “attractive” element, preceding punitive
selection, may plausibly make sense.
41 One is that natural selection has to operate on something: being a selection, it cannot
invent and is, therefore, powerless to promote adaptation unless favorable variations
continue  sporting  in  a  relatively  frequent  and  sustained  fashion.  In  the  sphere  of
thought, mistaken possibilities are endless, while the effects of truth and error (under
primitive  conditions)  are  considerably  shielded  from  the  selective  pressure.  (Being
wrong and fast would normally be better than being right but slow.) The mind cannot
evolve  adequate  conceptions  of  even  the  most  fundamental  categories,  unless  it
happens to be from the start more or less apt to form conceptions of a potentially
successful sort. We must start with something like a “scent for the truth” (CP 6.531,
1901) before we can be pressed to develop the very rudiments of the mental apparatus
that makes our concern with truth, however unconscious, an operative element in the
struggle for survival.
42 Hence, there is a clear point to Peirce’s worry that if “there be nothing to guide us to
the discovery,” we would “have to hunt among all the events in the world without any
scent” (W 3,317, 1878) – a futile undertaking and, potentially, a dangerous one. The
tendency to make the right connections, of the sort that is required for the productive
work of natural selection to take off, need not be anything elaborate. We merely need a
tendency for the mind not to wonder aimlessly for too long, spinning connections ad
libitum, capriciously, or in accordance with the order of stimuli that has little relation
to causal order. Once such a tendency is there, the natural selection can refine its flow
over time; without such a tendency, it is not clear that we are entitled to speak of a
mind in the first place.
43 The second consideration is of an historical sort, and pertains to the development of
philosophy and science, both of which have largely been driven by an interest in reality
as a rational structure, rather than a mere setting of the struggle for prosperity and
survival.  In  fact,  very  frequently,  concern  with  the  more  mundane  interests  was
believed to obscure the greater philosophical truth, to result in a sense of intellectual
myopia. Meanwhile, if one does construe common sense largely as a product of gradual
adaptation, it makes sense to think of it as comprising strategies and notions designed
to manage practical conundrums, and management requires bracketing things off and
smoothing  them  over,  reducing  risks  and  clinging  to  the  familiar.  In  other  words,
reliable management of external pressures encourages, to some degree, a closure of
conceptual  horizons,  resulting  in  a  warranted  attitude  of  suspicion  and  distrust
towards  radical  possibilities.  Common  sense,  then,  is  theoretically  conservative.
Therefore, an interest in radical theoretical exploration must be guided by some other
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instinct, some other drive, which urges one to forgo practical considerations for the
sake of intellectual or aesthetic satisfaction.
44 One could actually suppose that the very same primitive attunement to the scent of
truth that lies at the origin of the evolution of common sense continues to operate
independently  in  theoretical  inquiries,  wherein  it  is  refined  and  elaborated  not  in
accordance with the demands of external pressure, but in conformity with a sense of its
own intrinsic normativity. One can think of it, for example, on the analogy with the
language  acquisition  faculty,  which,  although  incapable  of  generating  a  formed
language on its own, enables the learning of language within a time-frame that would
be unimaginable without such innate capacity.
45 One may also be warranted in following Peirce when it comes to identifying the input
of this instinctual capacity in terms of feeling: a conceptual response to secondness in
the  areas  where  the  established  structures  of  thirdness  provide  no  determinate
guidance can only be based on a qualitative sense that certain ways of configuring the
relationship at hand feel less right than others. It is also plausible to suppose that the
dictates  of  this  feeling  are  worked  out  most  systematically  and  immediately  in
mathematics,  regarded  by  Peirce  as  the  first  science  requiring  no  foundations
(Hookway  2000,  183).  So  mathematics  would,  then,  be  the  prime  discipline  of
developing  one’s  aesthetic  sense,  giving  concrete  form  to  one’s  premonitions  of
reasonableness.
46 Peirce’s interest in normativity in his later work, when read in this key, appears quite
natural,  as  does his  estimation of  his  prior work as radically incomplete without it
(Maddalena 2010, 262). Reality, as a view of the world suffused with reasonableness,
cannot simply be informed by the external pressure of experience – it requires instead
an  active  reconstruction  of  this  experience  in  accordance  with  the  progressively
articulated ideals of reasonableness developed in the light of considerations that can
only  bear  a  tangential  relationship  to  the  business  of  practical  management  and
survival. This is why ideal norms “alone raise Humanity above Animality” (EP2: 465;
1913). Peirce’s conception of aesthetic ideal also has to be understood in this context.
Its foundation is not pleasure, but a kind of intellectual empathy with the world, which
assures  us  that  “general  principles  are  really  operative  in  nature”  (CP  5.101,  1903)
generating  what  Peirce  calls  “a  reasonable  feeling,”  i.e.,  a  feeling  that  “one  can
comprehend” (CP 1903, 5.113). It is easy to see why Bernstein is inclined to draw an
analogy between Peirce’s conception of aesthetic and Plato’s conception of Good (1971,
193-4), for, here the notions of beauty, goodness, and reason are all brought together,
in the conception of the admirable or ideal. Attainment of this ideal, in turn, would
permit “free development of the agent’s own esthetic quality” (CP 5.136, 1903), thus
giving a concrete sense to the idea of a free rational life admirably lived.
47 The aesthetic feeling, apparently, relates to the arrangement of parts within the whole
(CP 5.132, 1903), so it is related to a sense of measure and proportion, to a sense of
intellectual prosody, qualitatively experienced. My own preferred term for what is thus
experienced is the “mood” of the presentation, deriving from Peirce’s comment about
the poetic mood “in which the present appears as it is present” (CP 5.44, 1903). Other
designations are used by different commentators: “feeling tone” (Rosenthal 1994, 100),
“suchness” (Hausman 1993, 126), and, most descriptively, the “firstness of a thirdness”
(Hookway 1992, 174). Peirce, on one occasion, refers to this as “flavor sui generis” (CP
1.531, 1903). The problem with endorsing such a feeling, as Hookway justly observes, is
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to  “understand  how  standards  adopted  without  justification  can  have  objective
validity” in such a way that they are “not psychologically determined but hold for all
rational agents” (1992, 59). As Peirce observed with respect to logic, the (occasionally)
felt compulsion may have its place, but it would be a grave error to reduce logicality to
this  compulsion (CP  3.432,  1896).  The  same would  hold  for  an  aesthetic  ideal  that,
insofar as it belongs to the universe of firstness, is plagued by the additional problem of
never being capable of “perfect actualization on account of its essential vagueness if for
no other reason” (Peirce 1908, 30).
48 Peirceans are fortunate in that they do not have to be stumped by questions of this
sort. One simply needs to ask what habits of thought and action the adherence to a
particular ideal involves, and to appraise the consequences of such habits within their
proper field of application. Pragmatism, then, provides a clear meaning for the notion
that an ideal can be tested, supplying, in the bargain, a sense of what it may mean for
an  ideal  to  be  compromised  or  improved.  To  the  degree  that  my  penchant  for
symmetrical structures leads me to significant discoveries that otherwise could not be
made, my aesthetic feeling remains on the right track. To the degree that it makes me
overlook significant effects of asymmetrical structures, my unconditional preference
for it requires adjustment and curtailment.
49 One must not think, however,  that our normative intuitions are not accountable to
anything beside the theoretical consequences of their systematic deployment. Reality,
as an ideal, is not only characterized by reasonableness, but also by sharedness, i.e. by
its public character; hence, the consequences that we consider are always, at least in
part,  social  consequences.  Considerations  pertaining  to  the  conditions  of  social
coexistence  must  have  a  due  effect  on  one’s  reflexive  musings  about  the
appropriateness  of  her  feelings.  As  Peirce  puts  it,  “If  conduct  is  to  be  thoroughly
deliberate, the ideal must be a habit of feeling which has grown up under the influence
of a course of self-criticisms and of hetero-criticisms; and the theory of the deliberate
formation of such habits of feeling is what ought to be meant by esthetics.” (CP 1.574,
1906.) Our feelings, then, are jointly answerable both to the sense of inner satisfaction
and to the practicalities of social interaction, under the obtaining external conditions.
Therefore,  common  sense  has  a  rightful  bearing  on  the  continued  appropriate
development  of  the  aesthetic  instinct  of  reasonableness,  which,  in  the  course  of
evolutionary history, must have stood at its source.
50 This brings up, in turn, an important question about the permeability of the instinctive
foundations of thought to cultural influence. On this score, the expression of aesthetic
sentiment can be expected to be more malleable than common sense. This is so because
it is a mere feeling or sensibility that has not undergone any specific determinations in
the course of evolution; common sense, on the other hand, involves the formation at
the biological level of some relatively specific structures or thought-categories that,
like anything biological,  must  display a  considerable resistance to modification and
change. Biological evolution operates on the scale of at least thousands of years, so
appreciable  modification  to  the  innate  structures  of  common  sense  could  be  only
affected by a fundamental change in conditions of existence, lasting over a sufficiently
long period (biologically) to exert sufficient selective pressure. In that regard, the deep
structure of common sense may well be shared between ourselves and our preliterate
ancestors.
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51 The  trade-off  here  is  between  development  and  stability.  The  base  categorical
framework of common sense provides us with a tried foundation for managing our
ordinary  interactions  with  external  reality.  As  Peirce  points  out,  “Our  innate
mechanical ideas were so nearly correct that they needed but slight correction” (W
4,450,  1883).  At  the same time,  this  foundation does  not  suffice  for  the purpose of
drawing precise distinctions valued by science, nor does it give us much direction in
the areas far removed from the natural conditions of life. It can be virtually unerring,
but only within its proper area of application; yet that is the foundation on which all
other scientific inquiries are built (CP 5.522, 1905). The categories of common sense
provide  us  with  a  structure  that  proved  itself  workable  through  the  thick  of
evolutionary time: yet, it is only that – workable. It is by no means the final instance of
truth. Yet, in functioning as our instinctive point of departure, it serves as a safety net
for our theoretical  and experimental enterprises;  should they fail,  we return to the
ordinary frame of reference, where we are never completely at sea. Hence the curious
dynamic between critical inquiry and common sense, involving “a complex interplay of
intellectual reflection and trusting acquiescence in habitual judgments and sentimental
responses”  (Hookway  2000,  260).  There  is  in  culture  a  kind  of  biological  inertia,
ensuring  that  our  relationship  to  experience  at  no  point  may  end  up  entirely
unworkable. There is a sense of reasonableness and aesthetic instinct, ensuring that we
venture beyond what is  necessary for mere comfort and survival.  There is  also the
historically accumulated cultural capital of a given society at a given time, on terms of
which these natural  proclivities get filled out and fine-tuned within the span of an
individual generation.
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NOTES
1. Peirce’s position is more radical in that he equates cognizability and being (W 2,208, 1868). The
upshot  remains  the  same:  namely  that  we need not  and cannot  concern ourselves  with  the
uncognizable.
2. When Peirce says that what he means by the “real” is merely a demonstrative sign pointing
back to the familiar world (W 4,250, 1881), his use of “real” pertains to what is here designated as
phenomenal or external reality.
3. References to Peirce, for the most part, follow the standard format: CP for Collected Papers, W
for Writings: the Chronological Edition, and EP for The Essential Peirce. References to Peirce’s letters
to Lady Welby will be henceforth given as (Peirce, letter’s year, edition page number).
4. Since my choice of terms binds tightly the notions of reality and truth, it may appear to be at
odds with Hookway’s view that we can have truth without reality and reality without truth. (See
Hookway 1992, 139.) However, from the context, it seems clear that what Hookway means by
reality is phenomenal reality. Hence he is right: our ultimate conception of reality may contain
elements to which no external experience corresponds (e.g. moral ideals), and there will be parts
of our experience that will never gain sufficient resolution to be counted as part of a determinate
conception.
5. Italics are mine.
6. For discussion see Magada-Ward (2003, 220).
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7. References to Kant are given by work and section number, following the Academy edition.
Critique of Judgment is abbreviated as CJ, and follows the translation by Werner Pluhar (Hackett,
1987).
8. My use of the term “subject matter” is meant to closely resemble what Gadamer means by
Sache, i.e., the thing that we are talking about, the shared topic of a communicative episode.
9. Or even oneself at a later time.
10. Peirce uses the expression “subject of discourse” to mark that which is designated by an
index (W 5,224,  1885).  My use of  “provisional  identification” is  intended to resemble what is
sometimes referred to as a “passing theory.”
11. Peirce thought that correspondence may be useful in producing a sense, however, vague of
what approximately may be meant by truth (CP 8.100, 1900). However, when taken literally it
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